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This paper provides a framework which deals with various types of transparency concerning the
composition of order flow. Using this framework, we study the relationship between transparency and
price volatility as a measure of liquidity. We derive conditions under which increasing transparency
reduces price volatility, demonstrating that increased transparency does not always imply less
volatility.
* The views expressed herein are those of the author. They do not reflect those of the Bank of Japan.1
1.  Introduction
Market transparency is defined as “the ability of market participants to observe the information on the
trading process” by O’Hara (1995). Transparency has many dimensions because a market has many
kinds of participants and many types of information.
In this paper, we focus on a special type of transparency that concerns the composition of order flow,
especially liquidity-motivated order flow. We should note that even it still has multiple dimensions.
Madhavan (1996) considered a market in which all traders observe the entire liquidity-motivated order
flow. It is transparent in one sense. Röell (1990) considered a market in which broker-dealers trade
based on private information regarding order flow by their liquidity-motivated customers. It is also
transparent in another sense.
It should be noted that, when we consider transparency concerning the composition of order flow, we
must pay attention to how much of, what part of, and by whom the order flow is observed. These
features’ distinctions have rarely been theoretically discussed in the literature.
Extending the models of Kyle (1989), Röell (1990) and Madhavan (1996), this paper provides a model
in which a part of order flow is disclosed to the public, part of it is observed by a part of traders, and
part of it is not observed by anyone.
Using the model, we study the relationship between transparency and price volatility as a measure of
liquidity.
1 More precisely, we investigate the optimal level of transparency that minimises price
volatility. We consider two types of transparency. One is transparency for public information. This
concerns the situation in which all traders commonly observe the same order flow, which is similar to
that in Madhavan (1996).
2 The other is transparency for private information. This concerns the
situation in which different traders observe different and independent order flow, which is similar to
that in Röell (1990).
According to the main results, we know the following. In the case of transparency for public
information, when the variance of order flow is large enough and the market is not transparent,
increasing transparency reduces price volatility. Too much transparency, however, increases price
volatility. In the case of transparency for private information, when the variance of order flow is large
enough, increasing transparency reduces price volatility, and the most transparent markets enjoy the
least price volatility.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 shows the existence of
linear symmetric equilibria of the model, which we concentrate on. Section 4 studies transparency for
public information. Section 5 studies transparency for private information. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2.  A model
In our model, a single risky asset is traded in an auction market. The liquidation value of the asset is
denoted by v ~  which is a random variable normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 
1 -
v t . The
realised value of v ~  is donated by v. In the remainder of the paper, a variable with a tilde denotes a
random variable and that without a tilde denotes its realised value.
1 Price volatility suggests the degree of market transparency, at least indirectly, though it may not necessarily be a direct
measure of market liquidity.
2 Madhavan (1996) assumed that all order flow is observed by traders. Our model only allows for part of it to be observed.
We are interested in the amount of order flow that minimises price volatility.2
There are N  informed traders, each of whom is indexed by n = 1,…,N. Trader n receives a private
information signal concerning v ~ , which is a random variable  n n n v i e e e ~ ,...., ~ . ~ ~ ~
1 + =  are
independently, identically, and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 
1 -
e t .
Noise traders’ order in aggregate, denoted by Z ~
, is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
2
Z s . We assume that there are random variables  1 1 0
~ , ~ ,..., ~ , ~











where  k z ~  is independently and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 
2
k s  for






k k Z s s . We also assume that 
2 2
1 k s s = for  N k ,..., 1 = .
0
~ z  is a part of Z ~
 which is publicly observed by everyone. For  n z N n ~ , ,..., 1 =  is a part of Z ~
 which is
only by trader n  partly observed.  1
~
+ N z  is a part of Z ~
 which is not observed by anyone. Thus, it can
be interpreted that larger 
2 2
0 / Z s s and 
2 2
1 / Z s s , or smaller 
2 2
1 / Z N s s + , imply more transparency.
2 2
0 / Z s s  concerns transparency for public information. 
2 2
1 / Z s s concerns transparency for private
information.
The models of Kyle (1989), Madhavan (1996) and Röell (1990) can be considered as special cases of
the above model in the following sense. Kyle (1989) studied markets with  0 /
2 2
0 = Z s s and
0 /
2 2
1 = Z s s . Madhavan (1996) studied markets with  1 /
2 2
0 = Z s s  and  0 /
2 2
1 = Z s s . Röell (1990)
studied markets with  N Z / 1 /
2 2
1 = s s and  0 /
2 2
0 = Z s s . We investigate the optimal degree of
transparency by considering intermediate cases and conducting comparative statics of price volatility
with respect to 
2
0 s  or 
2
1 s  for given 
2
Z s .
After receiving signals  0 ,z in  and  n z , trader n  creates a demand schedule  ) , , ; ( 0 n n n z z i X × . The
vector of demand schedules are denoted by  () N X X X ,..., 1 = . The market clearing price  p ~  is






n n n Z z z i p X
1
0 0
~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ .
To emphasise the dependence on  X , we denote the market clearing price and the quantity traded by
trader n  as  ) ( ~ ~ X p p =  and  ) ( ~ ~ X x x n n = , respectively.
Each informed trader has exponential utility with risk aversion coefficient r . Each informed trader
has a non-stochastic initial endowment, which is normalised to zero. Thus, the utility function of trader
n  can be written as  () ( ) rp p - - = exp n u  where  () n x p v - = p  and  n x  is the quantity traded.3
Definition 1
The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game is a vector of strategies  X  such that
() () ( ) () () () () () n n n n n n X X x X X p Eu X x X p Eu ¢ ¢ - ³ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ u u
for any demand schedule  n X¢  and n = 1,…, N.
3.  Symmetric linear equilibria
Following Kyle (1989), we focus on a symmetric linear equilibrium, in which  n X  is an identical
linear function of  0 , , z i p n  and  n z , for n = 1,…, N. We write the equilibrium strategy  n X  as
() n n n n n z z p i z z i p X 1 0 0 0, , ; d d g b + + - = (1)
Theorem 1
There exists a symmetric linear equilibrium if  3 > N .The parameters in (1) are determined by the
following equations:
()






- - 1 1 1
1
N
e ,( 2 )
() () r t g g b





- - - -
- -
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 N N
N e ,( 3 )
()












N e ,( 4 )
()












e ,( 5 )
where
() e g N t b
j
2 1 1 1
1
- - - +
= ,







1 1 1 s s s d - + + - = Z N g .
The proof, which is based upon the technique developed by Kyle (1989), is provided in the appendix.
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that  0 = v t . This implies that informed traders have a prior
distribution for v ~  that is least informative.
3 This assumption simplifies our analysis due to the
following lemma.
3 In Bayesian statistics, it is often suggested to use the least informative priors.4
Lemma 1 If  0 = v t then  b g = .
We consider the relationship between transparency and a variance of the market clearing price
conditional on v ~ , which is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If  0 = v t then











2 2 1 1 2
~ ~ 1 1 ~ ~
+
- - - - + + + + + = = N e v p N N N N v p V s s d s d b t s .
4. Transparency for public signals
This section studies the case where  1 / 0
2 2
0 £ £ Z s s  and  0 /
2 2
1 = Z s s . For  n z N n , ,..., 1 =  is (almost)
always equal to 0 and conveys no information. In other words, every trader receives a public signal
0 z , but has no private information concerning Z ~
.
Theorem 2
Suppose N is large. For given  0
2 > Z s , there exists unique  () [ )
2 2 2 *
0 , 0 Z Z s s s Î such that































s s s s
v p
Z Z .
In addition, there exists 
2 *
Z s  such that  () 0
2 2 *
0 > Z s s if 
2 * 2
Z Z s s > and  () 0
2 2 *
0 = Z s s if 
2 * 2
Z Z s s £ .
The proof is provided in the appendix.
Suppose 
2 * 2
Z Z s s > . In this case, increasing transparency, 
2





0 Z s s s £ . Increasing 
2
0 s  more than  ()
2 2 *
0 Z s s , however, increases price volatility. Thus,
()
2 2 *
0 Z s s  provides the optimal level of the transparency. Note that  ()
2 2 2 *
0 Z Z s s s < .
Suppose 
2 * 2
Z Z s s £ . In this case, increasing transparency always increases the price volatility.
5. Transparency for private signals
This section examines the cases where  1 / 0
2 2
1 £ £ Z N s s  and  0 /
2 2
0 = Z s s .  0 z  is (almost) always
equal to 0 and conveys no information. In other words, trader n  knows his private information  n z , but
does not have any public information concerning Z ~
.5
Theorem 3
Suppose N  is large. For given  0
2 > Z s , there exists unique  () [ ] N Z Z / , 0
2 2 2 *

































s s s s
v p
Z Z N .
In addition, there exist 
2 * *
Z s   and 
2 * * *
Z s   such that  () N Z Z /
2 2 2 *
1 s s s =   if
() N Z Z Z Z / 0 ,
2 2 2 *
1
2 * * * 2 s s s s s < < ³  if  ,
2 * * * 2 2 * *
Z Z Z s s s < <  and  () 0
2 2 *
1 = Z s s  if  
2 * * 2
Z Z s s £ .
The proof is provided in the appendix.
Suppose 
2 * * * 2
Z Z s s ³ . In this case, increasing transparency, 
2
1 s , always reduces price volatility.
Suppose 
2 * * * 2 2 * *





1 Z s s s £ . Increasing 
2
1 s  more than  ()
2 2 *
1 Z s s , however, increases price volatility. Thus
()
2 2 *
1 Z s s  provides the optimal level of transparency. Note that  () N Z Z /
2 2 2 *
1 s s s < .
Suppose 
2 * 2
Z Z s s £ . In this case, increasing transparency always increases price volatility.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has provided a framework which can deal with various types of transparency concerning
the composition of order flow. Using this framework, we study the relationship between transparency
and price volatility. We derive some conditions under which increasing transparency reduces price
volatility, demonstrating that increased transparency does not always imply less price volatility.




0 ,..., , N s s s  that minimises price volatility




0 ,..., , N s s s
and other measures of market liquidity or welfare of traders.6
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Let  k c  be the equilibrium strategy where
k k k z z p i 1 0 0 d d g b c + + - =
for  N k ,... 1 = . For the market clearing price  p ~ , we write  ( ) n k n n z z i p x ~ , ~ , ~ ; ~ ~
0 c = . Then
() () 0
~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ ~
1 0 0 = + + - + - - + å å
¹ ¹




k n d d g b .
Solving for  p ~ ,











+ + - + = åå
¹¹ n kn k
k k n Z z z N i p
~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~
1 0 0 d d b l .
Note that  n x ~  is the optimal amount of trade conditional on  , ~ ~ , ~
, 0 n n z z i  and  p ~ . Thus,  n x ~  maximises
[ ] n n n n z z i p x p v u E ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ) ~ ) ~ ~ (( 0 - . However, due to (6), () p xn
~ , ~  uniquely determines  n p ~ . Also,
() n n p x ~ , ~  uniquely determines  p ~ . This implies that  n x ~  is the optimal amount of trade conditional on
, ~ ~ , ~
, 0 n n z z i  and  n p ~ . Thus  n x ~  maximises  ( () ) [ ] n n n n n z z i p x p v u E ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~
0 - .
When  n u is exponential utility with risk aversion coefficient r , it is known that maximising
( () ) [ ] n n n n n z z i p x p v u E ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~
0 -  is equivalent to maximising
() [] () [] n n n n n n n n z z i p x p v V z z i p x p v E ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~
2
~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~







~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~
2
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~
n n n n n n n n n n n x z z i p v V x x p x z z i p v E
r
l - + - .( 8 )
The first order condition for maximisation of (8) with respect to  n x ~  is
[ ] 0 ~ ~ 2 ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ 1
0 = - - -
-
n n n n n n x p x p z z i p v E t l (9)
where  [ ] n n n z z i p v V ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ / 1 0 = t . The second order condition is
() 0 2
1 < + -
- rt l .7
Because  n n x p p ~ ~ ~ l - =  and  [ ] [ ] n n n n n n z z i p v E z z i p v E ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~
0 0 = , (9) is rewritten as
[ ] 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ 1
0 = - - -
-
n n n n x x p z z i p v E rt l .
Solving this for  n x ~







~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~
~






rt g rt l N
p z z i p v E p z z i p v E
x
n n n n
n (10)
Note that all the random variables,  n o n z z i p v ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , ~
,  are jointly normal. Thus, t is a constant and
[ ] n n z z i p v E ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~
0  is linear with respect to  n o n z z i p ~ ~ , ~ , ~
, . This implies that  () n k n z z i p , , ; 0 c  is, in fact, a
linear function.
The next step is to derive  1 0, , , d d g b . In order to do so, we calculate  [ ] n n z z i p v E ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~
0  and
[ ] n n z z i p v V ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ / 1 0 = t  assuming that () k k n k k z z p i z z i p 1 0 0 0, , ; d d g b c + + - =  for  N k ,..., 1 = .
The market clearing condition is











+ + + + - å å
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d d b g




~ ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ ~
+
= =






k z z z N i p N d d b g
() 1 1
~ ~ 1 ~ ~
+
¹ ¹




k z z i p N d b g () ( ) . 0 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~
1 0 0 = + + + + + N n z z N i d d b
Thus
() [] () ( ) [] n n z z N i p N N ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ ~ 1 1 0 0
1 d d b g b + - + - - -
-










- å å 1 1





k z z N e N v d b
Let  n m ~  be the left hand side of this equation. Note the following:
·  ( ) n n z z i p ~ , ~ , ~ ; ~
0  is statistically equivalent to ( ) n n n z z i ~ , ~ , ~ , ~
0 m .
·  () n z z ~ , ~
0  is independent of v ~  and of ( ) n n i ~ , ~ m .
This implies that  [ ] n n z z i p v E ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~
0  =  [ ] n n i v E ~ , ~ ~m .
( ) n n i v ~ , ~ , ~ m  is normally distributed with mean vector
( ) [ ] () 0 , 0 , 0 ~ , ~ , ~ = n n i v E m8
and covariance matrix
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1 1 1 + + + - = N N g s s d . These directly provide  [ ] n n z z i p v E ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~
0  and t .
The result of calculation is:
() ()




t j t t
b t
t t t 1
1 1
1
2 2 1 1 - + + =
- + -
+ + =













































t 1 ~ -
+ =
() () [] () ( ) [] N n
e
n
e z z N i p N N
N
i ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ ~ 1
1 ~
1 0 0
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e
n
e z z N p N i ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ ~ 1
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1 1 r t g g b
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- - - - .9
In a symmetric equilibrium,  n n n z z p i x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
1 0 0 d d g b + + - = . Thus, we have
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() () r t g g b
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+ -
=
b s s a t












2 1 2 2
1
3 2
1 1 = - + - + - - - º + +
-
N N e N N N f s a s b t a s a s a (17)
() 0 1 = a f  has a solution  ()[] 1 , 0 * Î b a  because  () 0 0 1 < f  and  () 0 1 1 > f . If  () 0 1 = a f  has multiple
solutions in [] 1 , 0 , let  () b a *  be the largest one satisfying  () () 0 * > ¢ b a f . Then, because
() () () () ( ) ( ) , 0 1 2 * *
* 1 = - + ¢ ¢ =
¶





() 0 * < ¢ b a .
Due to (13) and (14),
()( )







- + + - º r t b b r b t b e e N
N
g g N N f
            ()
2 1 3 1 1 b r b t
- - + - = N N e















+ - - + - +
-
+ + r t s s a b s s a e N N N
N
N N (18)10










, 0 * r t a b e N
N











- - r t e N
N
f , and  () 0 2 > ¢ b f  for any  0 > b .
Due to Brower’s fixed point theorem, the map () ( )( ) () a b b a b a * , * , ®  has a fixed point. This
fixed point provides the values of b  and  1 d , which then determines g  by (14).




















This and the values of b  and g  determine  0 d .
Proof of Lemma 1
Plugging  () () e e e e v N N jt t jt t t t 1 1 - + = - + + =  into (13) and (14), we can show that the right
hand side of (13) and (14) are the same.
Proof of Lemma 2
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1 1 0 0























1 1 0 0
~ ~ 1 ~ 1
1 ~ 1 ~ d d
b
Thus,











2 2 1 1 2
~ ~ 1 1 ~ ~
+
- - - - + + + + + = = N e v p N N N N v p V s s d s d b t s .
Proof of Theorem 2
When  0
2




















2 2 1 1 2
~ ~ 1 +
- - - - + + + = N e v p N N N s s d b t s






- - - - + - + + =
-
b b s d t g g N N N Z e .11
Note that b  is determined only by
() ( )







- + + - = r t b b r b t b e e N
N
g g N N f
which is independent of  1 d . Rewriting this:
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b r t
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Here we introduce new variables w and t such that  ()
1 1 1
- - - = r wt b N e  and 
2 2 - = r t s e Z t .
Then this leads to the calculation result:
() () [] B A g g N N Z
v p / 1















()() () r s b r b
2 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 Z N N N A - + - + - - = () ( ) () e Z N N N N t r s b r b
2 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 + + + - +
()
3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 e Z e Z N N N t s brt s - + - +
    
()( [ ) () w
r
t





1 ) 1 ( 1
1
2
+ - + + - -
+ -
=
                 () () () ]
4 2 3 4 3 2 3 1 3 w w w N N Nt t N N Nt N - + + - + + + - +12
and
() ( ) ()











N N e .






~ ~ v p
















             () () ( ) w t N N t N N
2 3 1 1 + - + + - - =
() () ()
4 2 3 4 3 2 3 1 3 w w w N N Nt t N N Nt N - + + - + + + - + .
Because
() ( ) 0 1 , 0
3 < - - = t N N t x ,
() () ()() () () , 0 4 2 1 4 1 2 6 , 2
2 2 3 > + - + + - + + - + - = - t N N N N N N t N x
























There exists unique  () ( ) 2 , * - Î N O t w  such that  () 0 , > t w x  if  () () 2 , * - Î N t w w  and
() 0 , < t w x  if  () () t * , 0 w w Î .
Let
() ()
() ( ) w
w w
r t w











Then we know the following:
·  If  () () t t t * * w > , or  ( ) ( )
2 2 1 2 2 * *
- - > r t r t s w s e e Z Z t , then
( ) ( )
2 2 1 2 2 2 *
0 * *
- - - = r t r t s w s s e e Z Z t .
·  If  () () t t t * * w < , or  ( ) ( )
2 2 1 2 2 * *
- - < r t r t s w s e e Z Z t , then  0
2 *
0 = s .
When  0
2
1 = s  and thus  w s ,
2 g Z =  takes the largest value, and  () w * t t = . In this case,












() ( ) ( ) w w h N N N N + + - + - = 1 2
3 4 () () ()
4 3 2 2 2 3 4 1 2 w w w + + - + + + - - N N N N N .
Because
() 0 0
4 < - = N h ,
() ( )( ) () 0 4 2 1 8 2
2 > + - + + - = - N N N N h ,
() ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 0
3 > + + - = ¢ N N N h ,
()( ) ( )( ) () 0 4 3 8 1 2 2 2 < + - + + - + - - = - ¢ N N N N N h ,
there exists  * w  such that,  () 0 > w h  and  () () 0 * , > w w x t for any  () 2 *, - Î N w w  and
() 0 < w h and  () () 0 * , < w w x t  for any  () * , 0 w w Î . This implies that  ()
2 2 * * *
- = r t w s e Z t .
Proof of Theorem 3
When  0
2
0 = s ,
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2 2 1 1 2
~ / ~ 1 +
- - - - + + + = N e v p N N N s s d b t s
          () [ ] g N N e + + + =




2 2 1 1 1 s d b t .
This leads to the calculation result:
() [] B A g N



















3 3 4 4 9 4 3 w w + + + - = A t N t t N ()
5 3 4 w w + + t N   () ( ) () w w w w 3 2 3 2 2
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~ ~ v p
 is the same as that of A .
Consider
() A = t , w x
            
2 2 2 4 3 6 4 3 4 w w t N t N t N t N + + - = () ( )
5 4 2 3 3 2 6 4 9 4 w w w N t N Nt N N + + + + + - + .
Because  () ( ) ()
, 0
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t N t  there exists unique  () ( ) 2 , 0 * - Î N t w  such that
() 0 , > t w x  if  () () 2 , * - Î N t w w  and  () 0 , < t w x  if  () () t * , 0 w w Î .
Note that
() () () () () () ()
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t t d w x w
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Then we know the following:
·  If  () () , * * t t t w <  or  ( ) ( )
2 2 1 2 2 * *
- - < r t r t s w s e e Z Z t , then  () 0
2 2 *
1 = Z s s .
·  If  () () t t t * * w >  and
( ) ( )
() () () ()
2
2 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 2 2
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We can calculate that


































































1 = s , w  takes its largest value, and  () w * t t = . In this case,
() () () ( ) () w h
w
w










2 3 2 4 3 5 4
1 6 4 3 8 3 4 w w w h N N N N N N + + - + - =
() ( ) ()
5 4 2 3 3 2 1 6 5 9 6 w w w N N N N N + + + + + + .
A simple calculation shows that  () ( ) () 0 , 0 2 , 0 0 1 1 1 > ¢ ¢ > - < w h h h N . This implies that there exists
*
1 w  such that,  () 0 1 > w h  and  () () 0 * , > w w x t  for any  () 2 ,
*
1 - Î N w w  and  () 0 1 < w h  and
() () 0 * , < w w x t  for any  ()
*
1 , 0 w w Î . This implies that  ()
2 *
1
2 * * *
- = r t w s e Z t .
When  w s s , /
2 2













= . In this case,
() () () w h
w
w










() () ( ) ()
4 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 5 2 3 4 9 10 8 12 16 w w w w w h - - + - + + - + - = N N N N N N N N .
A simple calculation shows that  () ( ) () 0 , 0 2 , 0 0
"
2 2 2 < > - < w h h h N . This implies that there exists
*
2 w  such that,  () 0 2 > w h  and  () () 0 * , > w w x t  for any  () 2 ,
*
2 - Î N w w  and  () 0 2 < w h  and
() () 0 * , < w w x t  for any  ()
*
2 , 0 w w Î . This implies that  ()
2 *
2
2 * * * *
- = r t w s e Z t .17
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